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FOREWORD
This report is one of five documents covering the results of the Space
Station Crew Safety Alternatives Study conduoted under Contract
N_SI-172W2. The _tudy documentation is designated as follows:
Vol, I - Final Summary Report (NASA CR-3854)
Vol, II - Threat Development (NASA CR-3B55)
Vol, Ill - Safety Impact of Human Factors (NASA CR-)856)
Vol. IV - Appendices (NASA CR-3857)
Vol, V - Space Station Safety Plan (NASA CR-3858)
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APPENDIX B
PRELIMINARYSPACE STATION CREW SAFETY THREAT LIST
The threats listed here are generic in that each threat may have more
than one possible cause. Further in this study, potential hazards will be
developed for these threats, allowing specific identificationof controlling
safety criteria and guidelines.
The scope of issues covered are threats that affect crew health and well
being directly and threats that impact the space station and its ability to
continue functioning. Sources of threats can be external to the space
station,crew initiated,space station hardware/softwareresponsible,or
generatedby hardware/softwareand processes dedicatedto space station
experiments,payloads,and cargo.
Desigl}and operational guidelineseventuallywill ilaveto be drawn up for
the space stationand its dedicated crew equipment, for crew functions,as
well as for carry-ons: experiments,payloadsand cargo.
FIRE
A fire in an area containing subsystemsequipment,electricalwiring, or
laboratoryequipment,or in personnelareas which damages and puts out of
commissionall unprotectedoperating equipment in a compartment. Fire
prevention in design leans heavily on isolatingthe elements of combustion:
Fuel, Oxidizer and Ignition. In a two-gas system (80% N2 and 20% 02) the fuel
is excluded only if all materials are screened for flammability. Applying
"NASA MSC Requiremen_-_-forMaterials and Processes",JSC-SE-OOO6B,tllroughthe
RI-SD Material Control (MATCO) program screenedshuttle materials for
flammability. In a I00% 02 environment (such as in EVA pre-breathingareas),
all surface temperaturesmust be analyze_ _o ensure that no ignition sources
[ are availableand the containedmaterials are not flammable at high 02
concentrations. "EnvironmentRequirementsand Test Criteriafor the Orbiter
! Vehicle",MFO004-OI4C,cites maximum allowable surface temperaturesin each of
i the compartmentsbased on the potential fluid leaked into the compartment.
Fluid leaks are considered credible. Additionally,smoke/firesensing and
i supressioncould be included in Damage Control design.
LEAKAGE
Leakage of any gas or liquid which is produced, stored,or routed through
the pressurizedareas of Space Station volumes, includingany chemicals used
or that may be produced in experiments. The leakage may occur at any point
throughwhich the fluid is routed. Leakage rates must be assumed and
increasedmargins and/or system make-up capabilitymust be included in the
design. Selection of materials and seals for faying surfaces is critical to
the life of the Space Station in orbit. Seal selection,expected life,
condition at installation,and installationtechniquesdetermine leak
susceptibilityat a11 penetrations.
TUMBLING/LOSSOF CONTROL
Space Station attitude maintenancesystems require at least
fail-operational/failsafe capability. Considerationof a requirementfor
maintenance and returningthe system to operable status should be given.
Forces that may cause tumbling or loss of control, other than attitude
i
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maintenancesystemfailure,couldinclude: momentsimpartedby Orbiter/OTV
dockingor collision,fluidor gaseoussystemsleaking/venting,crewactivity
withinthe station,and the like. Recoveryfromand immediatereactionto
D SpaceStationtumblingshouldbe a systemdesignrequirementincludingcenter
of gravityandmass distributioneffects.
BIOLOGICALOR TOXICCONTAMINATION
Contaminationthreatsare thoseassociatedwithbiologicalor toxic
contaminationof the foodor watersupply. All similarlypackagedfoodstored
in any one area (e.g.,all vacuum-packedfoodstoredin one pantry)willbe
assumedunfitto eat. Similarly,all potablewaterin connectedtankswill
alsobe assumedtoxic;the water,however,may be reprocessedthroughthe
waterpurificationsystemand the tanksdecontaminatedto renderwater
potable. Thisthreatis associatedwiththe releaseof toxic,flammable,
corrosive,condensible,or particulatematter. Contaminationis causedby
leakage,spillage,outgassing,looseobjects,_brasionand fromthe growthof
fungusor releaseof volatilecondensiblematerials.Leakageof or out
gassingof hazardousmaterialssllouldbe preventedby eliminatingsuspect
materialsthroughMATCOscreening.Closelooksat materialsinteractionsare
alsorequired.Wherehazardousmaterialsare broughton board,special
E containmentconsiderationmust be given. All materialsbroughton board
i shouldbe screened,includingastronautpe_nal effects.
INJURY/ILLNESS
&
Physicalinjuriesmay be causedby impactor collisionwith stationary
I: objects havingsharp edges or protrudingpartsor with shrapnelor projectiles
fromexplodingtanksor acceleratedlooseobjects. Physicalinjuriesmay also
be causedby ingestingparticulatematter,touchinghot or coldsurfaces,and
by breathingoxygendeficientair. Careand controlto preventsharpand
": abradingprotrusionsand the inclusionof handholdsand otllerconvenient
_L restraintsfor astronautsminimizesexposureto injury. Crewillnesscould
resultfromexposureto pathogenicbacteria,toxicmaterials,or to excessive
radiationlevels. The physio.ngical/behaviorallimpactof microgravityof the
crew for longtimeexposureis not ciearlyunderstood.Personalhygieneand
closecontrolof foodpreparationminimizesexposureto illness. Crewillness
and injurymustbe treatablewithinthe SpaceStation. The sophisticationof
medicalfacilitiesisyet to be determined.Deathof an astronautcannotbe
ruledout,raisingthe questionof what procedureis to be followedforthe
dispositionof the remains,i.e.,returnto earthor burialin space- burle_
at sea precedence.
GRAZING/COLLISION
Thisthreatconcernsinternalas wellas externalelementsand can b_
causedby stru;turalfailure,proceduralerroror inadequatestowaoeand
handlingrationale.Externalthreatscan be causedby Orblter/OTVor EVA
astronautscomingintounplannedcontactwith the SpaceStation. A grazing
collisionwith anothervehiclewhichdamagesequipmentoutsidethe spacecrait,
suchas RCSjet_,radiators,solarpanels,antennas,tanks,fluidlines,
dockingmechanisms,etc.,isconsideredhere. The collisionis not severe
enoughto causea penetrationof primarystructurebut may damageexposed
equipment.Potentialcolllsioncandidatesmustbe identifiedand the specific
threatdefined.
/0
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!CORROSION
Tldsthreatconcernsstructuraldegradatio of metallicand nonmetallic
equipment.Leakageof corrosiveor reactivematerialscan degradean'susefulnessand/ rcausestructur lor mechanicalfailures.
Materialincompatibilityat Jointsof dissimilarmetal_:an l__eadto corrosion
when subjectedto internalenvironmentextremesof tow,,'atureand humidity
acceleratingcorrosionin carbonor mostorganicmaterials. Examplesof
corrosiveprocessesincludestresscorrosion,electrolyticorrosion,and
polymerization.Causativeagentsincludeacid,salts,solvents,halogens,
etc. Thc M_TCONprogramis setup to screenagainstcorrosiveagentsand
processes.
MECHANICALDH.iAGE
Mechanicaldamageis definedas beingcausedby collisioninsidethe
i vehiclewith loose out-of-controlmasses. Damagepotentialof systems
requiresassessmentas to impacton missioncontinuation,typeof emergency
I precipitated,postulatedamage,protectionaffordablein designand mission
recoveryimpact. Externalcauses(Fire,Explosion,Collision,Penetrations,
Attack,Sabotageor HumanError)may not be preventableand requiresthat
systemdamagetoleranceshouldbe a significantdesignconsiderationfor
criticalsystems.
EXPLOSION
Inthe eventof an explosion,the damagew111be confinedto one
:L compartmentand willconsistof overpressure,heat,shrapnel,and atmospheric
:_ contaminants.All equipmentin the compartmentmay be damagedand made
inoperative,unlessarmor-platedfor protection.Violentreleaseof energyas
a resultof equipmentoverpressurization,fire,chemicalreaction,excessive
temperature,equipmentmalfunctionor structuralfailureare candidatecauses
• for explosion.For instance,an explosionof .025Ib TNT equivalent,
releasing50 BTU of energyin the formof heat,shockwavesand kineticand
thermalenergyof shrapneldamagecouldbe confinedto one compartmentand
wouldconsistof overpressure,heat,shrapneland atmosphericontaminants.
The equipmentwouldrequirerepair/replacement,dependingon the damagean
explosioncan produce. Furtherhazardswhichcan resultin a compartmentby
sucilan explosion,suchas fire,etc.,shouldalsobe consideredas partof
the threat. Wallsand primarystructure,or equipmentoutsidethe affected
compartment,wouldprobablynot be damaged. (021) Equipmentwhichcan
disintegratexplosivelyincludespumps,motors,blowers,rocketmotors,
generators,laser,etc. Inexcludingequipmentand materialsfromSpace
SationhabitablevolumeswhoseTNT equivalencyexceedsTBD,explosionimpact
ca, bc_nlmized. Equipmentand materialmountedexternallyto the Space
Stationhabitablevolu_=_thatexceedthe thresholdTBO TNT equivalencyshould
includeshrapneldivertershieldsor otherhuffersto protectthe habitable
volumesfromcatastrophicpenetrations.Guidelinesconcerningpressure
sensing,relievingand control,chemicalscreeningto preventuse of violent
reagents,and systemheatrejectionare key elementscontrollingexplosion
risks.
LOSSOF PRESSURIZATION
A lossof pressurizationin a habitablevolumemay be causedby an
accidentalpenetrationof an outsidewall or bulkhead. Pressuresensing,
leakageand maintenanceimplythe needfor a DamageControlSystemon-board
the SpaceStation. Sucha systemwouldincludepressure,temperatureand
toxicitysensingwithadditionalcapabilityfor smokesensingand fire
71
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bsuppressionfor each isolatable compartment in the SpaceStation with primmary
I and back-upreadoutpanelslocatedin separateSpaceStationareas. If
compartmentsizeand criticalityso indicate,a needmay existfor automatic
controlof hatchactuation.Thesedesignconstraintsare dependentupon
assumedpenetrationsize,sizeof eacllisolatablevolume,use frequencyof the
compartmentand criticalityof the adjacentcompartments.
RADIATION
Radiationthreatsare associatedwiththe exposureof the astronautsas
_ wellas equipmentto ionizingradiation,ultravioletor infraredlight,lasers,and electromagneticor radiofrequencyradiation.Ionizingradiation
threatsmay be causedby leakingor inadequatelyshieldedradioactive
equipmentsuchas RTG's,particleaccelerators,liquidmetalheatexchangers,
etc. RF and electromagneticradiationfromRF generatorscan triggerordnance
devicesor interferewith theoperationof criticalequipment.Allowable
levelsof eachof theseenergiesmust be established,and designaccommodation
made to ensurethatthe SpaceStationastronautsand equipmentare protected.
OUT OF CONTROLIVA/EVAASTRONAUT
-_;
L Lossof controlof astronautsduringIVA/EVAmay be causedby
i malfunctioningmaneuveringdevicesor lackof adequatehandholdsand other
restraints.The issueof aberrantastronautactionscausinga problemmustbe
• considered.Rapidrescueis requiredby a companionalrea ysuite and
i_ conditionedto the suitatmosphere,who is waitingin an airlockor is also• performi gEVA or IVA. Equipmentadequacyand redu d cycouldaddressthe
formerissue,the lattermay requiresomephysicalrestraintsystem,equipment
or facility.
INADVERTENTOPERATIONS
Criticaltasksand systemscontrolsshouldbe analyzedto assessthe
impactof inadvertentoperations.Hardwarecan be protectedby switch
wickets,lever-locks,etc. Sofb_arecan be protectedby two or three
"and"-ingrequirements,as wellas beingprotectedfromastronautmodification
on-board. Recommendatonsare for automatinga11 routinefunctions,with
manualwork-aroundsas required.
LACKOF CREWCOORDINATION
Withinthe aviationindustry- bothcivilianandmilitary- experience
has shownthatlackof crewcoordinationin timesof crisishas almost
invariablyresultedin catastrophe.Someof the recentmajordisastersin
commercialair travelhaveoccurredas a resultof the entirecrews'attention
beingdivertedto troubleshootingthe problemaffectingthe airplanewhileno
one paidattentionto the ordinarychoresof pilotingand navigatingthe
airplane.Onemajorairlineradicallychangedcrewtrainingand upgrading
techniquesto addressthisproblem. Similarproblemsof lackof crew
coordinationcouldarisein a SpaceStation. It is important hatcritical
routinefunctionsbe mannedat all times,if not automated.Thiswilla11ow
investigationof malfunctioningequipmentby personnelnot dedicatedto
routine,but essential,SpaceStationequipment.Crewtasksshouldbe
reviewedcarefullywith_hispotentialproblemin mind.
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ABANDONMENTOF SPACESTATION
There sliould be a passive capability of the SpaceStation to survive
abandonment. A combination of accidents and/or subsystemsdegradationrequiring the abandonmentof the statton by someor all of the occupying
personnel is considered here. Suchabandonmentwtll not be a time-critical
emergencybut a deliberate abandonmentplanned over a period of days to
months. The worst destgn case is whenone of the separate pressure volumes
has been evacuated and sealed off for sometime becauseof major damageor
contamination, and all personnel are in the remaining volume. If the cause
for abandonmentconcerns the Inability of the _tation to support human
habitation, the station should be able to maintain crtttcal functions, suchas
attitude maintenance. A cause for abandonmentcould be loss of a breathable
atmosphere. Critical avionic equipment should be able to function in the
absenceof an atmosphere. An important task related to the above hazard, that
was considered during this effort was the Escapeand Rescue. The philosophy
adopted with respect to escape and rescue is stated below:
Increased Reliability
or Redundancy Preventive Built-In
DamageControl
Compartmentalization Preventive Built-ln
ImprovedEmergency
_: Sensors Preventive Built-ln
On-BoardPreventive
Maintenance Preventive Built-ln ;
AbortCapability Remedial Built-ln
!'- PersonalSurvival
- Equipment Remedial Separate Built-ln ,On-BoardRepair
I. Capability Remedial Separate Built-ln
On-BoardMedicalAid Remedial Separate Built-ln
On-BoardEmergency
"RED"Systems Remedial Separate Built-ln
"Buddy"Concept
(SeparateType) Remedial Separate
On-BoardEscapeandWait Remedial Separate
On-BoardEscapeand Return Remedial Separate
SpareEarthReturnModule Remedial Separate
Unmanned/Manned
Assistanceor Rescue
EarthLaunched
(PostEmergency) Remedial Separate
"Pre-Deployed" Remedlal Separatet
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ELECTRICALSHOCK
Whenpersonnel,duringthe normaloperationsof equipmentor due to|; singlepointfailuresor maskeddualpointfailures,are exposedto
electricallyenergizedcomponents,terminalstrips,bussbars,_lur_dcharge
apparatus,etc.,thatthrougha combinationof electricalpgtential,current
andbody resistancewouldallowa person'sbodyto offera patnforcurrent
flowto groundand resultin shockor electrocution,a hazardpotential
exists. A hazardousvoltageor powersourceis any potentialsourceof pm_r
thatcan pruduceseriousshockor burnsor a fatalcurrent,dependentuponbody
resistance,contactconditions,andpatllthroughthe body (seetablebelow).
Alsoequipmentwhichsensesor controlscriticalcontrolparametersof flight
systemsor is reasonablycapableof applyingdamagingelectricalenergyto
supportedsystemsis classifiedas SafetyCritical.
PROBABLEEFFECTSOF SHOCK
k
CurrentValues(Mllliamps)
_, AC60HZ DC Effects
0-1 0-4 Percepti on
1-4 4-15 Surprise
4-21" 15-80" Reflex Action
21-40" 80-160" Muscular Inhibition
40-100" 160-300" Respiratory Block
OverlO0* Over300* Usually Fatal
*SeriousShockor Burns.
METEOROIDPENETRATION
A falloutof spacedebrisstudieswillhaveto be a probabilityof strike
and an assumedsizeof meteoroid.The potentialimpactof thisthreathas not
been specificallydefinedat thistime. However,basicassumptionshould
considerpotentialmeteoroidpenetrationof the primarystructure.Physical
damageshouldbe confinedto one compartmentand is assumedto consistof
finelydividedmoltenhigh-speedshrapnel(fromspallationof the innerwall).
STORES/CONSUI_ABLESDEPLETION
Consumables,both for the SpaceStation as well as for the astronauts,
require establishing levels that account for leakage, spoilage, unexpected
high consumptionrates, etc. The key to establishing quantities, is
determining what survival time, without support from the ground is required:
96 hours,sevendays,or what? Automaticl_,,ento_yingof criticalconsumables
should be considered.
INTRUSION/ATTACK
ScreeningrelatedliteratureindicatesthatIntra-crewmemberhostility
was an issueon the longerspaceflights. When spacestationsevolveand less
highlymotivatedand dedicatedpersonnelare includedin crews,special
screeningof candidateswi!l be required.Thisthreatcouldbe psychological
74
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as well as physical. STS-5, and subsequentflights where more tllan two crew
membersareon board,wlllbe watchedcloselyas crew interactionwlll be more
I complex. How to approachthe impactof thisthreat: withsedation,by
employing"PolarisPajamas",by isolatingoffendingcrewmembers,etc. -must
be determined.Overtmilitaryactionand externalIntrusion/attackis a
falloutof a spacestationsurvivabilityanalysisand is beyondthe scopeof
thisstudy.
STRUCTURALEROSION
Thisissuehas beenobservedin longliwd spacecraft.Spdcedebrisand
otlmurminutia progressirelycan erodemetalIic or non-metalIic enclosuresto
the pointwhereleakagecouldoccur. If the erodedskinsallowfluidor gas
containmentsystemsto leak,undesirablespin/tumblingmomentscouldbe
reactedintothe spacestationand/orconsumablescouldoe lostoverboard.
Thisis a downstream"wear"issuebut appearsto be realenoughto addressin
the program.
ORBITDECAY
Consumablesneededto updateorbitalpositionor to overcometheeffects
of spacestationdragmay becomean issuewhenlargecaptivestructuresAre
beingconstructedpriorto separationfromthe spacestation. Credibilityof
thisthreatis understoodwhenone considersa fullyoperationalspacestation
in its plannedworkingenvironment.Thistilreatimpactsconsumablemargins.
_ LOSSOF ACCESSTO A HATCH
,r_ The lossof accessto any one hatch,door,or otherpersonnelor cargo
' transferopeningbecauseof jatmningof themechanism,eitheropenor closed;
or becauseof obstructionby cargo;or becauseof a localizedhazardous
; situation(fire,chemicalspillage,electricalhazard,etc.).
: Compartmentationto allowaccessto "safehavens"requiresa minimumof two
egresspathsfromeachhabitablevolume. Presentspacestationdesign
philosophyappearsto providethiscapability.Designdriversare hazards
thatdestroycompartmenthabitabilityand requiresurvivalworkarounds.
TEMPERATUREEXTREMES
Abilityof crewand equipmentto functionundervaryingtemperature
stresses needs to be considered. Emergenciessuchas the Apollo 13 Service
Module tank explosion, may be postulated to determine tile credibility of this
threat. Unexpectedheat inputs from expertments/p_yloads/cargo needbe
addressedearly to ensure the space station's ability to grow into its
operational phase. This threat deals indirectly with planned margins and
absolute capabilIties.
DEBRIS
The threat category of external debris excludes meteoroids and is usually
referred to as space garbage. Nominally, space debris, as opposedto
meteoroids,wouldhavelowerclosureratesa11owlngthe possibleoptionof
colli'_ionavoidance. Internaldebris,on the otherhand,can clogfiltersand
directlyaffectequipmentoperationand crew performance.The Orbiterhas
experiencedcloggedfiltersdue to lint,affectingair cooledavionicsand
overloadingfanmotors.
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FREE-ORBIT
One of the threats to extravehicularactivity (EVA) is drifting into afree-orbitCrom which there is no autonomous return capability, Such an event
could be c;used by an MMU failure at a remote work site, drift through loss of
tether, or tileunexpected releaseof stored energy which results in
inadvertentdetachmentfrom local structure. Some primary sources of stored
energy are: propulsivePressure Garment Assembly leaks, RCS plume
impingement,and impact from auto-deployablestructures. 14osthazardousare
those propulsivetype failures that could boost a crewman into a free-orbit
which is not coplanar with his prime habitat.
k b
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iAppendix C
SPACE STATION
CREW SAFETY CRITERIA
These criteria were eclecticallyassembled from
ind,Jstryspace station studies beginning as early
as 1968. Those criteria that were relevant to the
current space station studieswere carried forward,
if not in detail, at least in intent. Reassessment
of threats under Contract NASl-17242evolved
additionalcriteria that are included.
20 January 1984
Rockwell International
Space Transportationand
Systems Group
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SPACE STATION Rev. December 15, 1983
CREW sAFETY CRITERIA
DAMAGE TOLERANCE
A-I No credible single space station failure, operationalerror ur radio
frequencysignal should result in damage to sFace station or missio_i/
payload equipment or in the use of emergency equipment; some limited
degradationin mlssion/payloadacconlnodations,crew convenience/
comfort, or space station attitude or orbit may I)eallowed
A-2 No credible combinationof two space station failures,
mission/payloadequipment failures,operator errors, or radio
frequencysignals should result in the potential for crew injury Qr
permailentloss of the space station or primary mission/payload
capability; institutionof emergency procedure/equipmentmay be
necessary,but no hazardous operationallevel will be reached
A-3 All subsystem/equipmentcritical to preservationof life and space
station survivalshall be fail-operational/fail-safe(excepting
primary structureand press_qrevessels)
A-4 Fail-operatiorlal/fail-safed signed subsystemsshould allow
maintenance to upgrade th_ subsystem/equipmentwithout being degr_4ed
;" below fail-safe during the maintenance actions followingthe second
failure
F A-5 Potentiallyrupturablecontainersshould cow_tainless material (gas,liquid, solid) tl}an_ould cause unacceptableoverpressureif all the
material were released in a leakage, rupture or explosion
A-6 Redundant accommodationsfor command and control of the space station
shall be provided such that the primary control center has complete
capability,but the backup control center will have, as a minimum,
control of critical functions
A-7 Design inhibits to prevent failure propagationfrom one
volume/subsystem/componento another should be incorporated
_-8 The space station should be designed and operated so that any damaged
module can be isolated from the rest of the Station in TBD seconds,
as required. Frovisionsshall be made for pressure isolationwithin
the volumes. Modules should be equipped so that the crew can safely
continue a degraded mission and take correctiveaction to either
repair or r_place the damaged module
A-g Any volume should be capable of sustainingthe whole crew, and
capabilityshould be provided for perfectingcritical functionsat an
emergency level until tilecrew can be rescued. Electricaland fluid
lines in each pressure-isolatablevolume required for critical
functions should be protected against the effects of explosion, fire,
vacuum, and corrosion
,|
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A-IO Capability should be provided for performingcritical functionswith
a portion of a subsystem inoperativefor maintenance,and any
pressure-isolatable volume inactivated and riotaccessible
A-ll Redundantequipment, lines, cables, and utility runs, which are
critical for safety Gf personnelor mission continuation,should
either be located and routed in separate compartments(i.e.,
separatedby a structuralwall) or should be protected against fire,
smoke, contamination,loss of pressure,overpressure,and shrapnel
A-l2 All walIs, bulkileads,hatches and seals whose integrity is required
to maintain pressurizationor atmosphericisolation shall be readily
accessiblefor inspectionand repair by crewmen in pressurizedsuits
A-13 As a design goal, inspection,inaintenanceand repair of critical
subsystemsby shirt-sleevedcrewmembersshall be accommodated.
CREW PROTECTION
B-l Provisions_hould be made for a safe haven within the space station,
isolatablefrom the hazard capable of sustainingthe crew for 21 days
beyond normal resupply and allowing rescue by a Slluttle. Provisions
shall be made to monitor the health of the remaining habitable
modules from this safe haven
_-2 Personnelprotection from electrical shock, radiation,mechanical and
i_ th__al hazards should be provided
B-3 Accesswaysbetween compartmentsshould be sized such that an IVA/EVA-
suited crewman is allowed free passage
B-4 Provisionsshall.bemade for the protectionand survivalof the whole
crew during solar storm activity as defined by the TBD design mission
radiationmodel
B-5 Personnelescape routes should be provided in all hazardoussituations
B-6 Provisionsand habitable facilitiesshould be adequate to sustain the
entire crew for a minimum of 22 days during an emergency situation
,._hendamage repair is in progress
B-? Atmosphericstores and subsystemcapability sufficientfor two full
repressurizationsof each pres.curizedhabitable volume should be
maintained on/at the space station during manned operations
B-8 Access to EVA and IVA airlock and suit station(s)should be provided
for al_ credible emergency conditions. Airlock chamber(s) should be
providedto permit crew access for EVA/IVA operations
B-9 Two or more suited crewmen should participatein any pressure suit
activity and rescue provisionsshould be provided to a11ow safe
return to space station, followingthe incapacitationof any one
crewman
B-IO Real-timemonitoringof the atmosphereconstituents,including
harmful airborne trace contaminantsand odors should be performed.
Control shall be provided for each pressurizedhabitable volume
79
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B-II Two or more entry/egresspaths should be provided to and from every
module or pressure-isolatablevolume. Tlletwo paths should be
separatedby airtight partitions,or shall be at least lO feet apart,| and should each lead to an area in which the crew can survive until
escape, rescue or removal of the hazard
B-12 f4aterlalsused in the habitable areas shGuld not outgass toxic
, constituentsin the lowest pressure environmentand highest
temperatureto which they will be exposed
B-13 All EVA and unp_o_surizedcompartment IVA should be conducted using
the "buddy system". {t_Gte:buddy system critf:riacan be met with
suited crew to station exit in visual contact with subject.) The
buddy system should also be used during shirt,.leeveoperations in
hazardous areas
B-14 A margin of consumables should be provided onboard, sufficientfor
performingcritical functionsfor TBD hogrs at a reduced level
following any credible accident which rendersone pressure-isolatable :
compartmentunavailable '
, B-15 At least two egress paths should be available from each module for
emergency egress of personnelduring manned ground operations
B-16 Emergency pressure suits required in the space station, sized to fit
P any crewman, should be in readily accessible"Iocatlonswithin each
[ pressure-isolatable volume
[_ B-17 Provisions should be made for emergenc_medical treatmentof credible
accidents and illnesses for durationscompatiblewith the rescue
_, provisions
B-18 The safe environmentand the safe operationalstatus of activated
subsystemswithin the space station should be verified prior to
personnelentry, initially,and prior to reentry following temporary
station abandonment
B-I9 Oeployment and initiation of operationsconsideredhazardous should
be checked out f_om a safe location before exposing crewmen to the
potentialhazards
B-Z0 Provision should be made for the return of a crewman iqcapacitated
while performing EVA
B-21 Provisionsshould be made for the detection,handling,containment
and/or disposal of toxic, flammable,combustibleand hazardous
materials
B-22 Pressurizedvolumes should have adequate fres volume (not occupied by
equipment) to a11ow crew freedom of movement to support long-duration
habitation
B-23 Hazardousor toxic fluid storage, conduits and interconnectsbetween
modules ._houldbe e_ternal to the pressurizedvolume. Exceptionsmay
be made for flammablebut nontoxicgases where the maximum possible
quantity released by a leak cannot result ;n a flammablemixture
80
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B-24 Provisionsshould be made for detection and control of pathogenic
r'
i agents onboard the space station using methods harmless to crew andequipment
fl-25Planned crew tasks should be assessed initially,for compliance
intent witn TBD regulationsbefore performingsuch tasks; and crew
trainingprovided for each specializedand/or hazardoustask
B-2G Provisionshould be made for handling irrationalcrewmembersand tim
remains of deceasedcrewmembers
B-27 The occupied compartment'sacousticalnoise environmentshould be
within human tolerance noise exposure limitations,permit
intelligibleauMtory communications,have a minimum of pure tone or
narrow frequencyband(s), a minimum of intermittentor discontinuous
noises and a minimum of high-frequencynoises. System and equipment
design (includingsubcontractors)should be accomplishedfrom the
outset to produce an acceptablenoise environment. Desirably,the
noise environmentshould meet NC TBD-or-lowernoise contour for work
periods and NC TBD-or-lowerfor sleep periods
B-28 Any module designatedas a safe haven shall be providedwith an
airlock chamber at the port assigned for orbiter docking and rescue
to allow crew transfer and rescue from a degraded and/or marginal
safe haven. The rescue hatch shall provide for actuationfrom inside
or outside to accommodatecontingencies
B-29 Subsystems shall be designed to prevent inadvertentor accidental
activationor deactivationof functionsor equipment that would be
hazardousto personnelor the Space Station
B-30 Radiation doses that affect personnelsafety must be considered from
all sources, includingnatural environment,external isotope and
reactor sources (if any), electromagnetic,solar radiationand
internallyallowable radiationlevels from experiments,processes and
health maintenance/diagnosticequipment
B-31 Exposed surfaceswithin habitablemodules shall not exceed a
temperatureof II3°F (with a design goal of I05°F) and a low
temperatureof no less than 40°F
B-32 Except for contingencies,EVA shall not be used for hazardous
operationsor when a maneuveringspacecraftis within the proximity
operating zone (_5 nm)
STA';IONINTEGRITY
C-l Primary pressure structuralmaterials should be nonflammable.
Interiorwalls and secondarystructure should be self-extinguishing
C-2 Normally exposed nonmetallicmaterials should be self-extlngulshlng
in the most severe oxidizing environmentto which they will be
exposed. Means shall be provided for fireproofstorage of medical
supplies,maintenance supplies,food, tissue, clothing,trash, and
for other non-self-extinguishingitems, when they are not in use
81 %
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IC-3 Potentially explosive containers, suchas high pressure vessels or
volatile gas storage containers, shall be placed outside of and as
remotely as possible from personnel 1tvl ng and operattng quarters.
Whereverpossible the containers should be isolated and protected so
that failure of one w111 not propagate to others
C-4 Containment of all materials requiring return via the STSto prevent
contamination of the space station environment should be provided to
reduce the hazard of potential fire and toxic conditions
C-5 Tank supports should be designed to restrain the tank under
propulsive effect of rapidly escaping gas
C-5 Design provisions should be incorporated to prevent uncontrollable
hatch opening due to pressure differential s, and to al 1owcontrol 1ed
closing of hatch openings tdth or against pressure differentials, for
the worst care pressure differentials anticipated
C-7 Equipmentor materials sensitive to contamination should be handled
in a controlled environment. Fluids and materials should be
compatible with the combinedenvironment in which they are employed
C-8 Provisions should be madeto allow communicationbetweenany and all
isolatable/habitable volumeson a primary and backupbasis
C-9 Provisions should be madefor material usage, identification and
location mappingto allow real-time evaluation to determine adequate
i nspection/maintenance replacement frequencies
C-IO Fluid or gaseousflow, suchas pressure relief valves/exhausts, fuel .i
transfer disconnects, etc., should be designed to prevent torquing/
turrsing or undesirable translation motions to the space station
-k-
_ C-llAll reactioncontrolth,ustlngdevicesusedprimarilyfor altitude
. positioningof the spat.':station,and occasionallyfor velocity
_ changes,shouldbe locatedsuchthatthe exhaustplumedoesnot
impingeuponotherstructuralelementssuchas solarcells,areas
requiringEVA maintenanceor othervehiclesdockingwith the space
station
C-12Spacestationmodulesshouldbe tumbledto rid themof internal
debrisand contaminantsimmediatelypriorto preparationfor launch
iI: C-13 Provisionshallbe made for In-flightservicing,adjusting,
i cleaning,removaland replacementof offendingcompunents,testing
and repairingof all criticalsubsystems
C-14Wearitemsshouldbe llfecycletestedina realisticenvironment
C-15A11 personalitemsshouldbe screenedfor flammabilityand toxicity
!
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C-16 Space S_ation protectiveenclosuresshall be provided for all high
mass/high speed rotating machinery
): C-17 Active/passivecompartmentationshould be provided to contain and/or
prevent fire/explosion/depressurizationinitiationor impact
propagation. Compartmentsshould be inspectableto support damage
control and maintenanceoperations.
CONTINGENCYCONTROL
D-l Identifiedhazards should be eliminated,reduced to controlled
hazards,or specified as residualhazards
D-2 Provisionshould be made for detecting,annunciating,containing/
confirming,controllingand restoring to a safe condition emergepcies
such as fire, toxic contamination,depressurization,structural
damage, etc. The tools, tasks, spares, workspace, storage volumes
necessaryfor these provisionsshall be included in space station
design planning
D-3 For those malfunctionsand/or hazards which may result in time-
critical emergencies,provision should be made for the automatic
switchin_to a safe mode of operationand for caution and warning of
personnel
D-4 The capability snould be provided on the space station for the
detectionof malfunctionsand/or hazards, tracing to the failed
[i replaceableunit and the d_splay of informationto the crew necessary
for correctiveaction
D-5 Provisionsshould be made for the crew to ascertainthe hazard status
• of any habitablemodule external to the inhabitedmodule and to
mitigate or control remotely those hazards which would preclude safe
entry to the module in question
D-6 The crew must be able to override any automatic safing or switchover
capability. All overrides should be two-step operationswith
positivefeedback to the initiator,which report impending results of
the override command, prior to the acceptanceof an execute command
D-7 Windows should be provided in the space station to enable adequate
visibilityto accomplishsafe docking operationswith the orbiter or
other vehicles. Additionalw_ndows will be necessaryto monitor EVA
operations,logistic resupply operationsand to support photographic
requirements.Transmission through the w1,_dowsshould be such as to
protect the crew from harmful UV and IR radiation. Thermal flux from
the windows should be controlled to prevent excessive heat from the
crewman's face and head
D-8 An independentself-containedilluminationsystem should be provided
that will be automaticallyactivated ib_the event of a major primary
power failure or main lighting circuit malfunctionresulting in
circuit breaker interruption
D-g Materialsand components subject to insidious degradationin the
Space Station ionizing radiationenvironmentshall not be used where
that degradationcan cause or contribute to a crew hazard
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D-lO Provisionsshall be made for safe disposal of the Space Station or _II
any auxiliary part thereof without danger to flight or ground crew-
nw_mbersor the public
SELECTION/INDOCTRINATION
i E-I Crew selection should be based on selecteescros._-trainabllityin
fields other than speciality
E-2 Orbital crews should be an integral part of the air/ground system
active interface with on-orblt crews
E-3 Station crews and teaming should allow equal thirds of schedule for
on-orbit, ground interfaceoperation and recycle op¢.rations(post
orbit rehabilitation,leave, additionaltraining, public relations,
etc.)
E-4 Assurance should be provided that each mission segment crew is
familiar with l) Station Operations and Maintenanceas concerns
critical subsystem and 2) Proceduresnecessaryto render SAFE all
experimentsand/or user-processes
E-5 Screening criteria should include assessmentof attitudes,pilysical
needs, psychologicalneeds, personalitytraits, ability to function
•under stress, ability to accept direction,and TBD
84
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SPACESTATION
CREWSAFETYDESIGNGUIDELINES
i
.i
_ These design guide, ines were eclectically assembled
_i from industry space station studies beginning as
., early as 1968. Those guidelines that were relevant
to the currentspace stationstudieswere carried
4. forward,if not in detail,at least irlintent.
Reassessmehtof threatsunder ContractNAS1-17242
evolvedadditionalguidelinesthatare included.
21 February 1984
Rockwell International
Space Transportation ond
SystemsGroup
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SPACESTATIONSAFETYGUIDELINES
DesignGuidelinesAcronyms
AOM = Attitude/OrbitMaintenanceSystems
C_W = CautionandWarningSystems
CME CrewMessingEqulpmen_
COM = CommunicationEquipment
CPH = Cargo/PayloadHandlingSyst_ns
CSE CrewSafetyEquipment
CWS = CrewWaterSystems
OPS= Data Processing Systems
DUS Dockin9/Undockln9Systems
ECS= Environment Control System
EPD = ElectricalPowerDistributionSystems
EPG = ElectricalPowerGeneratingEquipment
FSE= Fluid System Equipment
B4S= Health Maintenance Systems
ZFM= In-Flight Maintenance
INT = Integration, two or more systems involved
MSE= Hechanical Systems Egu!_ment _
NUC Nuc/ear/xonizlng gaalatlon _ys_emsEquipment
OPS= Operations
RSD = RadiationShieldingDevices
STR = StructuralSystems
B6
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rSPACE STATION CANDIDATESAFETY DESIGN GUIDELINES
DG-INT-OOI. Normally habitablecompartmentsof more than 25 cubic meters(1380cubic feet) in volume shall have two or more exits into areas which
provide for personnel survival. These exits shall be at least 3 meters
I (IO feet) apart.
, DG-INT-O02. Flammable, explosive or gas generating material shall be
; located co that the energy cnntent which can be propagatedat any one location
shall not result in overpressurizationof the compartment from heat and gas
I productlon.
I DG-INT-O03. Flammable, explosive or gas generating material within
i 3 meters (I0 feet) of the entrance to compartmentswith only one entry/egress
I path shall be limited so that the energy content, if released,wlll not resultin damage of an environment which prevents shirtsleeve access through the
entrance.
i DG-INT-O04. Two ," more entrances into nor_lallyhabitable compartments
L cf more than 25 cub'r ,haters(880 cubic feet) in volume shall be shlrtsleeve
i accessible from each of the other normally inhabited compartments. These
[ entrances shall be at least 3 meters (10 feet) apart.
DG-INT-O05. Where only one shlrtsleeve ingress/egresspath Is provided
Into a compartmentor medule, redundailtmeans shall be available for opening
the connectinghatch(as) from either side.
;: DG-INT-O06. Capability shall be provided to depressurize adjacent
volumes before undocklng.
DG-ECS-O07. Capability shall be provided to reduce the pressure in each
habitable volume, sufficiently, or increase it in the adjoining habitable
volumes, and to cut off air circulation, so that in an emergency the
atmosphere in the affected volume will not be propagated into a_joining
compartments. Thts capability shall be controlled remotely from each
compartment.
DG-ECS-O08. Automatic venting capability shall be provided in each
habitable volume so that tn tile event of a fire or release of gases within the
volume the pressure will not exceed the structura_ limits of the structure or
the capability of the seals to other volumes to exclude the contaminated
atmosphere.
DG-INT-O09. Double contained toxtc flammable or corrosive fluid
containers shall be provided, with means to detect leakage of the toxic
flammable or corrosive fluid into the volume tn between the containers, and
with means to detect penetration of tile outside container.
DG-INT-OIO. Capability shall be provided to detect potential tank
failures by measurement of fluid pressures, temperatures, tank strains, or
otiler means.
DG-INT-011. The reflectance of surfaces of docking vehtcles and the
docking system that are vlsible to the controlling crew and TV cameras shall
be below eye and vidicon damage levels.
t, _ _
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DG-DUS-O12. The vtdtcon tubes for docktng s_.all be destgn_d for low
sensitivity to tube image b_rn.
DG-DUS-OI3. Redundant or replaceable llghtlng provlslons shall be
| provided for docking.
DG-DUS-OI4. Redundant or replaceablevldicon tubes shall be provided for
dockir,g.
DG-DUS-OI5. Redundantor replaceablevideo monitors shall be provided.
DG-DUS-OI6. Docking system rapid emergency release capability shall be
providad.
DG-DUS-OI7. The docking system shall be designed to withstand normal
jackknifing vehicle dynamics and will limit attitude excursions to within
prescribed limits as determined by space station geometry to prevent
inadvertentcon_.actfrom the docking vehicle.
DG-DUS-OI8. The docking system shall be capable of withstanding vehicle
oscillations and loads generated by inadvertent attitude control system
activity of either or both vehicles during draw down to rigidize the capture
interface.
DG-INT-OIg. Thermal protection shall be provided to prevent jet plume
impingement damage to the space station from docking vehicles within the
design angular and linear misalignments.
DG-IFH-02O. Capability shall be provided to recycle both capture and
seal latcheson the docking system from any phase of their status.
DG-INT-O21. All hardware in the docking tunnel will be flush mounted to
. interiorwalls of the cargo/crew transfertunnel.
DG-MSE-022. Stops shall be provided on hatches to prevent uncontrolled
opening if opened when a pressure differentialexists.
k
DG-DUS-023. All docking interfaceequipment shall be grounded.
DG-DUS-L24. At the docking ports, all electrical umbilicals shall be
i grounded until connection of the docking interface.
i DG-INT-025. Capability shall be provided for the emergency shlrtsleeve
i survival of a11 on-board personnel until the next resupply or emergency
shuttle flight following the loss of access to any one module/compartment. A
shirtsleeve accessible docking port shall be available. If the loss of the
habitable volume divides the space station into two or more isolated tlabitable
sections, then each section shall provide the survival capability for all
on-board personnel, including an available docking port.
DG-INT-0Z6. A backup EVA egress/ingress hatch which can be used for
contingency EVA shall be available. Capability for depressurization and
repressurtzation of the connecting habitable volume shall be provided.
_L
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iZ DG-INT-027. An emergency IVA or EVA return route shall be avallable for
-= any planned IVA activity independent of the normal IVA airlock route.
Depressurization and repressurizationcapability shall be provided for the
additionalvolumes which must be used.
DG-CSE-028. Emergency portable life support systems shall be available
in the airlock sufficient to sustain IVA personnel in an emergency IVA or EVA
return from planned IVA or EVA activity.
DG-COM-O2g. Conanunicationbetween any and all habitable/isolatable
volumes on a primary and backup basis shall be provided.
DG-EPG-030. Adequate venting of batteries shall be provided to prevent
contamination,overpressureor explosion.
DG-FSE-031. All filters, screc,lSor other devlces used to collect
contaminants or waste products shall be designed so they can be easily
serviced or replacedwithout releasingcontaminantsinto the atmosphere.
DG-C&W-O32. An audible And visual alarm shall be provided to warn the
crew of habitablevolume C02 partial pressure not within the prescribed limits
for crew safety. This alarm shall be provided both in the affected habitable
volumes and at the command and control center(s).
i DG-EPD-033. Equipment, including electrical wiring, that could become
contaminated or damaged by leaking prope lant shall be "iocatedto prevent
contact with possible leakage or shall be providedwith suitable protection.
!_! DG-INT-034. Means shall be provided for collecting and/or containing any _'
D loose fluids or debris that may result during replacementof system conponents.
--
:" DG-FSE-035. Fluid systems shall have provisions for shutting off the
flow of fluid to sections of the system or equipment which _re susceptibleto
: damage or leakage.
DG-FSE-036. All orifices, close tolerance valves and
contamination-sensitiveequipment in fluid systems, shall be adequately
protected from contamination. Futhermore, if the system is designed for
periodic flow reversal, or a possibilityexists that flow reversal can occur,
both sides of these items shall be protected.
DG-CME-037. Food supplies shall be stored in more than one storage
container.
DG-CME-038. A means for sterilizing containers where food is stored
shall be provided.
DC--CME-039. Food supplies which require cooling or refrigeration shall
_- be protectedby a redundantcapabllity.
DG-HMS-040. Means for controlling insects in the space station shall be
provided. The control method should be harmless to men and equipment.
DG-INT-041. The use of mercury on-board space stations should be
prohlblted.
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DG-ECS-042. Provision shall be made for the removal of ozone generated m
by X ray equipment or electricalarcs. i
DG-FSE-043. The number of conr_ectorsused to connect plumbing or
componentsin fluid systems should be kept to a minim_n.
DG-FSE-044. Safety requiremen+s for all subsystems/experlments/internal
payloads are needed.
DG-FSE-D45. Fluids required for operation af subsystems located in
habitable volumes shall be non-toxlc,non-fla,TmLableoand non-corrosive.
DG-/NT-L)46. Pressurized cmltainers should not be installed in normally
habitable volumes. When installed externally to normally habitable volumes,
shrapnel sldelds shall be provided to protect the normally habitable volumes.
DG-C&W-047. Visual and audible alarm shall be provided to warn the crew
of atmosphere contamination which exceeds the limits established for crew
safety. This alarm shall be provided at a minimum in the affected habitable
volume and at the command and control center(s).
DG-C&W-O4B. Where the possibilityexists that a fluid in a system could
become contaminated, means shall be provided to detect contamination and
provide an alarm at the command and control center(s).
DG-C&W-049. A system shall be provided to monitor the environmental
status of all potentially hazardous (explosive, flammable, toxic, etc.)
materials ._tmed on-board the space station, and display a warning signal in
the command and control center(s)when establishedlimits are exceeded.
; DG-C&W-050. A warning and alarm system shall be provided to alert the
crew of atmosphere relative humidity levels which are not within prescribed
limits, with the warning displayedat the command and control center(s).
DG-ECS-051. Provisions shall be made for containing, venting or
._liminatingodors and bacteria generatedby waste products and other sources.
DG-ECS-052. The composition of the sp_ce station water supply shall be
checked at regular intervals to ensure that contamination does riotexceed
prescribed Iimits.
DG-CWS-053. A capability shall be provided for maintaining the sterility
of on-boardwater supplies.
DG-CWS-054. Water storage systems shall have provisions for isolating
parts of the system which may have become contaminated.
DG-CWS-055. Water supplies shall be stored in areas which will minimize
the possibilityof contaminationfrom other space station systems.
DG-INT-056. System components shall be designed to withstand the
overpressureand heat pulse attendant to meteroid pcnetration.
DG-ECS-057. i,laterialsused for insulation or filler in space station
walls shall be non-combu.',tible.
I
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DG-IFM-058. Windows shall be designed to permit replacement without
degradingthe pressure or structuralintegrityof the space station.
| DG-.STR-059. Individualhabitable volumes shall be designed to _,_Itllstand
a rapid decompressionof any adjacent compartment.
DG-STR-060. Space station structure shall be designed as a structural
matrix with tllecapabilityof arrestingcrack and tear growth.
DG-INI'-061.Equipment located in habitable volumes shdll be designed to
create n(;hazard to occupants during the changing environment associated with
rapid decompressionof the space station.
DG-MSE-062. Automatic closure of hatches between habitable volumes, when
ressure decreases belo,wa specified limit, sI1ouldbe considered as a design
eature.
DG-OPS-L)63. Hatches between compartments should be closed except when
requiredfor crew transit.
DG-C&VI,.064.A means shall ', provided for visual inspectionof the hatch
as well :L,_the warning system, a safety check to assure that hatches or
other acce._sesto an area at a different pressure level have been secured
properly. Warning system displays shall be at the hatclland at the command
and control center(s),,DG-MSE-065. Pressure klatchesproviding access to an area of differential
pressure should be of a type that becomes more positively engaged under
pressure lotding.
DG-EC$-066. Hatch design should be such that loss of a hatch s#al
element will not result in a pressure leakage rate which exceeds the emergency
recompression system capabiIity.
DG-INT-067. Provision should be made for an airlock in the hatch or
hatchwaybetween separatelypressurizablecompartments.
DG-INT-068. A leakage repair system employing techniques and equipment
appropriate to the vacuum and gravity environment of the space station shall
be providedas a kitable part of the damage control system.
DG-HMS-069. Considerationshould be given to providing the equipment and
supplies necessary for general cardiopulmonary resuscitation and other
equipment and supplies that might be required for the,individualizedtreatment
of residualeffects of decompression.
DG-FSE-070. All pressure relief valves shall be designed to protect
against a regulatorfailed or stuck in the full open position.
DG-FSE-071. Plumbing systems which carry cryogenic fluids or hydrogen
peroxide should be designed such tllatadequate pressure relief capability
exists in those areas most likely to trap the fluids. Furthermore, to guard
against the possibility that a relief valve in these systems becomes frozen
shut or otherwise rendered inoperative,a backup pressure relief device, such
as burst disks, should be incorporated.
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i DG-INT-L)/?..All pressure systems should be designed to enable a planned
depressuriza_J_n;accurate sensors should be incorporatedto e_isurethat the
pressure is totally relieved prior to opening the syslem should that
requirementarise for maintenanceor other reason'.
DG-ECS-LI/J.Any pressurlzablevo]ume that carlbe confined or Isolated by
any means, such as by valyes, should Ino|ude some means for automatic
protectionfrom overi,re._,sure.
DG-FSE-IJ]4. Pressurized gas supplies should include restrictions tllat
will limit gas flow In the event of a pressurized gas plumbing fai,ure, to
that which carlbe llandledby the relief valves or ventintlsystem.
I)G-IF_I-(J]5.Design of space station structure and equipment, including
their Interfaces. shouId be such that all porti(ms of the pressu-e shell,
bulkheads and seals wi]] be accessible for damage Inspectionan,]repair. This
should apply to exterior as well as interior space station surfaces.
DI_-INT-076. Potentlally harmful effects on the crew members of r_pld
decompression should be minimized througll engineering considerations in
selection of space station atmosphere composition, pressu,e and habitable
compartment net volume.
DG-STR.-077.The space statio1_shall be of sufficier¢ structural strength
to safely maintain the requlre_ internal pressure within the expected launch
and mission environmentfor the period of orbital stay.
' DG-IFI4-078. Components which are vented to space (vacuum) shall be
replaceablewithout requiringcabin depressurizatlon,.
_L DG-IFM-079. Cabin pressure shall not be .vat,ed to space throughcompartmentsor outlets that are used to vent fluids
DG-ECS-080. Pressure relief d_vices for all pressurizedvolumes shall be
vented to areas ti_atwi_.1not endanger the crew or equipment.
DG-ECS-081. All cabin atmosphere overboard relief or "dump" valves (any
_' valve venting into space) shall be fail-safe in the closed position ana should
be self-indicatingwhen failed. Manual override or redundant manual val,,ing
should be provided as backup.
DG-¢&W-082. Total cabin pressure sensor_ shall be provided Lo detect
out-of-tolerancevalues of the toto,l cabin pressure. Detection ef pressure
change at an excessive rate, or outside the desired operating range, should
activate an alarm system to warn the crew to initiate appropriate remedial
action, The a]ann should be activated botl_in the affected habitable volume
and at the command and control center(s).
C_ DG-C&W-083. All pressure warning systems shall include provisions for
self-testand shall be self-indicatingillthe falled state.
I DG-EPD-O84. Wire bundles shall be routed and protected as to preclude
_. damage to the Insulationthrough flexing or bumping.
E'
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IDG-EPD-O85. Suitable positive means, such as Keying, shall be provided
to preclude accidental mismating of electrical connectors. Thls would he
especially significant for connector_ which are to be connected and
_ disconnectedduring orbital operations (e.g., experiments).
DG-EPD-(JSb. Consideration should be given to the design of electrical
subsystem components (e.g., wall switches, light bulbs, or hot plates) to
protect them from wear-out or inadvertent breaRage, wilichcould result in
generatingshorts or'arcing.
_ DG-INT-OB7. Enclosed air duct systems that include potentia_ sources of
p; atmosphere contamination should provide sensors immediately do_nstream of the
contamination scurce, which, if activated,would shut off the airflow through
this equipment and provide a visual and audible alarm at the command and
control center(s).
DG-ECS-O88. Active redundancy should be provided for equipment which is
essential to the control and detectionof atmospherecontaminants.
DG-EPD-089. All temporary electrical connections (outlets, connectors,
etc.) shall be so designed and/or operated as to eliminate the possibility of
arcing.
DG-EPD-090. Wire bundles should not be located near potential heat
sources, includingthose areas where potential for fire exists.F
DG-EPD-091. Provisions should be made to ensure proper pin connection at
all critical electrical connectors prior to the application of system power.
Verification should be made to ensure that all pin connections exist as
. designed, no pin-to-pin sh rts exist, and that no pin-to-shellshorts xist.
I DG-INT-092. All equipment and substructure shall be g',_oundedto the
basic space station.
lid DG-INT-093. A means should be provided to equalize electric potential
differencesbetween docking spacecraft.
DG-EPD-094. Multiple power distribution paths to essential electrical
equipment should be provided.
DG-C&W-O95. Sensors shall be provided to detect out-of-tolerancevalues
for critical electrical power source parameters, such as _,oltage,frequency,
current, temperature,etc., or momentary excessive power _urges resulting from
•.nt turn-on or turn-off. The sensor._should activate an alarm system at
• nd and control center(s) of de ationsfrom the desired parameters.
oG-Og6. Multiple or redundant primary electrical power sources shall
_d such that a single failure will not result in a complete loss of
p,'_m, electrical power, or cause failure of equipment which is unable to
survivemomentary power interruption.
DG-EPD-Og7. Protective covers shall be provided for all portions of the
electrical subsystem to which access is required (switch boards, terminal
boards, etc.).
I
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DG-EPD-(J98. Redundant electrical circuits for items critical to crew
safety should not be included in the same wire bundle.
DG-EPD-(J99. Power distribution lines should be routed in such a manner
that any damage resulting from fire, caused by a fa_It in the distributic,n
system, will have a minimal effect on other power distribution wires in tt,e
vicinity.
DG-OPS-IO0. Proceduresshould be establishedand means provided the crew
for controllingand/or eliminating contaminationthat is in excess of tileECS
capability to control on a timely basis.
DG-ECS-IOI. Redundant C02 removal equipment w_ch capability of manual
override of automatic operation should be provided to ensure a continuous
capability to keep the C02 partial pressure witnin allowablelimits.
DG-ECS-I02. The amount of toxic or potentiallytoxic materials (such as
materials or chemicals utilized in experiments) on-board the space station
should be limited such that accidental release of the total quantity of the
material will not produce contamination abo_e the capability of the
environmentalcontrol system to remove on a timely basis.
DG-HMS-I03. Threshold Limit Values (TLV's) of contaminants for long term
human exposure should be establishedfor space station environments.
DG-OPS-I04. Strict configuration control procedures should be
established over all materials incorporated in or brought on-board he
spacecraft.
DG-OPS-I05. The original orbital flight path selection and changes
required by station-keeping during the mission should be such that the
probability of collision with man-made debris or other spacecraft is
sufficientlylow to provide adequate confidence in orbit selection and program
decision to proceed.
DG-CPH-106. All bulk cargo should be properly tethered or otherwise
controlled during zero-gravityor partial gravity operations.
DG-OPS-I07. Procedures and equipment should be available for use in
event of death of a crew member.
DG-_IS-108. Procedures and equipment should be provided for the
preservation or disposal of the remains of deceased experimental plants or
animals.
OG-OPS-IOg. The program of selection, training, mission support,
physical conditioning, daily activities, and recreation should insure that
crew members remain confident in the mission and their roles in it.
DG-HMS-IIO. Procedures and eo;,,pmentshould be provided for restraint
and control of irrationalcrew members.
DG-HMS-III. Unauthorized per:_onnelshould be restricted from using
radiation-produclngequipment or handling and using on-board radioisotopes.
Consider the installationof eopropriate caution signs and/or other means of
warning, featuringvisible or audible signals.
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DG-HMS-112. Safe procedures should be established for the disposal of
radioactive waste or radiation-contaminatedmaterial. The procedures should
also include the actions necessary for the disposal of a spent or failed
i nuclear power reactor.
DG-HMS-II3. On-board handling and use of radioactive material or
radiation-producingequipment should conform or be consistent with established
NASA and Nuclear Regulatory Commission policy and procedures for radiation
protectionstandards.
DG-HMS-II4. Positive protective measures should be taken to prevent
accidentalexposure to personnel from RF or X-radiation.
DG-EPG-IIS. Nuclear powered electrical power sources should be located
and shielded to protect crew members f_om accumulating excessive radiation
dosage.
DG-HMS-II6. Crew location during the nucl;.arpower unit activation
should be restricted to refuge areas affording high protective shielding,
until radiation levels have been checked in all habitable areas within the
space station and have been found to be within acceptablelimits.
DG-NUC-IIT. Space station installed/residing active nuclear reactor
[ shall provide fail-operational/fail-safemeasures for emergency shutdown of a
reactor and provide alternate methods of reactor neat dissip_,ion in event of
failure of the primary cooling system.DG-RSD-II8. The space station radiation protection provisions shall be
I consistent with tileorbital flight path type, orbital height, and inclinationselected.
DG-CPH-IIg. Spacestation design and layout should make maximum use of
any on-boardmass as radiation shielding.
DG-RSD-120. Protection of the space station crew against the effects of
a nuclear device explosion in space that releases radiation into the space
station's orbital path should be considered.
DG-C&W-121. The location and characteristicsof the radiation detectors
should be consistentwith the expected radiation environment.
DG-INT-122. Radiation effects upon space station electronic materials,
microelectronic circuit elements, electrical systems, metals, ceramics,
polymers, and other organic and inorganic materials should be thoroughly
investigatedfor radiation-inducedtransient and permanent effects in terms of
false signils,degradation,catastrophicfailures,and contamination.
DG-OPS-123. In low-inclination(up to (_0degrees), low altitude orbits,
Extra-VehicularActivity should not be scheduled while the space station is
passing through the South Atlantic Anomaly. For polar orbit, the same
guideline applies. In addition, the occurrence of a solar event should
require that EVA be avoided.
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DG-(JPS-124.A mission radiation control program should be instituted to
develop radiation exposure ]imits, procedures, design criteria, and
responsibilitiesconsistent with the expected mission environ_nt and period
I of orbital stay.
DG-HtIS-125. A cumulativ_ radiation exposure record should be kept on
each crew n,ember and personr,¢lwbr have reached the limit of safe raoiation
exposure should b'ereturned to earth without delay.
DG-INT-126. Provision should be made in the space station for a
designated shelter that would serve as a haven for radiation protection
against possible high-intensityradiationevents. T._isshelter should contain
the necessary life support equipment and provisions consistent with the
maximum expected stay time for the particularmission profile.
DG-HMS-127. Space station radiation monitoring, including cumulative
radiation level records, should be maintained to ensure the precise
determination and provide clear notification of radiation conditions, and
warning of possibleover-irradiatlonof the space station.
DG-C&W-128. The space station detection system should continuously
monitor the interior and exterior radiation levels and record the accum_llated
dosage for the mission.
_ DG-RSD-129. Additional protection for crew members performing EVA in the
• proximityof a nuclear power source should be provided.
DG-INT-130. Precautions should be taken in the selection of spacecraft
materials to ensure that the materialswill not support induced radiation.
DG-OPS-131. l aintenanceprocedures for C02 control equipment should take
_ into account the possible high operating temperaturesof the equipment and the
possibilityof release of contaminants.
DG-OPS-132. The storage end disposal of combustible waste materials
should be SUCh that a fire hazard or traffic obstructienis not created.
DG-INT-133. Flame arrestors should be provided in all ducting through
which flame could propagate.
DG-INT-134. Cryogenic piping vstems should provide for both auto, tic
and manual emergency shutoff.
DG-EPG-135. Adequate cooling capability should be provideG to prevent
overheatingof electricalpower sources even during worst-case conditions.
DG-INT-136. Power generating and distribution equipment which is a
potential source of fire should be located in unpressurizedareas in the space
station.
DG-INT-137. Fire control equipment and/or methods should be provided
which can be automatically initiated, or are readily accessiole and can be
manually controlIed.
i
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IDG-INT-I38. E]ectrical insulation sl_ould i_e, as a minimum,
self-extinguishingin the ;pace station atmosphere.
DG-INT-139. Power equipment racks and cables should be as resistant to
1 fire as possible. Emergency equipment and casualty mode/damage control
operationsshould be developed.
DG-INT-140. All fluid lines should be adequately protected from freezing
due to proximityto cryogenics,or exposure to black space.
DG-INT-141. Heating elements which must be exposed to the atmosphere
should be provided with a device to prevent the propagationof flame.
DG-C&W-142. Areas where radioactivematerials are u_ed or stored should
be monitored for radioactivecontamination,and suitable warnings provided if
radioactivityexceeds establishedlimits.
DG-INT-143. Components which could generate excessive heat due to
friction should be automaticallymonitored for temperatureincrease and sealed
from the atmosphere. An overheatwarning signal should be provided.
DG-INT-144. The amounts of hypergolic, pyrophoric, or other easily
ignitable materials on board the space station should be restricted to the
minimum necessary, and close control should be exercised over their handling
and use.
DG-INT-145. Potential ignition sources, such as lighted cigarettes or
open flames, etc., should not be permitted within the pressurized inhabited
: compartment of the space station unless rigid control can be exercised to
insure that a fire hazard is not present.
DG-INT-146. If absence of oxygen is utilized as a means of preventing
fires, design should provide that no single failure could produce an oxygen
atmosphere.
DG-INT-147. Passagewaysshould be kept free of all combustible materiaJs
and oxidizers.
DG-MSE-14B. Lubricants used i,_mechanical componentswhich are essential
for survival should be capable of withstandingextreme temperatures.
DG-£C$-149. A capability for manually controllingoperat;on of equipment
used for cabin and equipment temperaturecontrol should be considered.
DG-EPD-150. Current limiting devices or techniques should be used to
preclude hazardous overcurrents. Devices should be readily accessible,
provide visible indication of their state, and be resistant to inadvertent or
accidental de-activlation, fire, explosion, shock and explosive
decompression. They should provide protection both to the current source and
to the "using"equipment.
DG-INT-151. Design provisions should be made which assure that no heated
surfaceswould provide a source of injury to crew members or provide a source
of ignition.
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DG-FSE-152. Propellant supply system equipment and plumbing which uses
toxic or potentially flammablefluids should be located in uninhabitedareas.
DG-INT-153. Equipment which has a critical temperature requirelnent
_hould be protected ,_yredundantor alternate temperaturecontrol capability.
DG-INT-154. Materials which are capable of self-propagation of fire
should not be on-board the space station in sufficient quantities or
concentra-tTonsthat ignitionwould result in a hazardouscondition.
DG-ECS-I55. Valves for oxygen systems of 3000 PSl or higher should be
slow opening and closing to minimize the possibility of ignition of
contaminants.
DG-ECS-156. Space station thermal protection provisions should be
consistent with the orbital flight path, orbital heCght, and inclination
solected.
DG-ECS-I57. Tl_ermalcontrol equipment wlloseoperation is critical to
crew safety should have redundancyprovided.
DG-ECS-158. Temperature sensors should be provided at critical points in
thermal control systems to detect out-of-tolerancetemperatures. Detection of
temperotures which deviate from the normal range should activate a_ alarm
system to warn the crew of the need for remedial action.
DG-INT-I5._. Procedures should be established and design safeguards
provided that will preclude operation of tnrusterswhen it might endanger crew
members involvedin EVA.
_ DG-AOI,I-160.Sensors should be provided t,)monitor the temperature of
attitude control tllrusterassemblies. The serJsorsshould activate visual
and/or audible alarm at the command and control _enter(s).
k
DG-AOI4-161. Angular rates of the space station should be continuously
I monitored during attitude change maneuvers. Detection of excessive ahgular
rates should result in automatic/controlledshutdown of operating thrusters.
DG-AOM-162. An automatic system for controlling thrusters to restore a
T tumbling space station'sstability should be provided,,
; DG-AOM-163. Redundancy should be provided for all components that are
i located outside pressurized inhabited areas and failure of which could resultin a loss of attitudecontrol.
i DG-AOI4-164. Yhe attitude maintenance system should have the capabilityto counteract the undesired motion imp rt d by fluid escaping Jlrougha hole
!" in a compartmentor pressure vessel.
i DG-AOI4-165. Interlocksshould be provided to prevent simultaneousmanual
ir anl automatic operation of the attitude control system.
i DG-AOM-166. A means for stopplng propellant flow to falled OPEN
thrusters should be provided.
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DG-INT-167. Outlets should be designed so that fluids being vented
overboard do not impose any torque on the spacecraft.
DG-FSE-168. Propellantsshould be stored in more than one tank or other
storage device.
DG-I_T-16g. Accessways between and within compartments should be sized
in such a manner that an IVA-suitedcrew member will be allowed to access to
normally used areas.
DG-STR-170. Hatches snould be capable of being operated _:romeither side
and a'cleast two methods for operating the hatches should be provided.
DG-ECS-171. Space station airlocks should have redundant pressurization
capability.
DG-INT-172. An alternate command and control center should be provided
in tho space station, possibly within the crew refuge area, to ensure
continuation(_fa minimum number of functions which are vit;_lfur base control
and crew life support, in the event the primary command and control center is
rendered incapableof providingthese functions.
DG-INT-173. Capability should be provided to e_llow entry into a
compartment, where fire or other emergency _.xists, i'o effect rescue of
incapacitatedcrew members or to combat a fire. The means of entry and the
procedures involved silouldassure that the emergency does not escalate or
spread to other locations in the space station.
DG-OPS-174. Mission rules should inc'.ude_he requirement that control
center "authority to proceed" be obtained immediatelyprior to the initiation
(by any cre_ember) of any activity which is hazardous either by itself, or
when performed in conjunction with other base activities being conducted
simultaneously.
DG-C&W-I75. Closed circuit television system with strategicallylocated
cameras should provide command and control center operator(s) real-tlme visual
informationon hazardous activities/operations.,
DG-OP._ .176. Simultaneousoccupancy (other than momentary) by the space
station con....ier and his deputy, of those compartmentsor locations which are
judged to have the highest safety risk probability,should be minimized.
DG-COM-IT7. Equipment in the space station for external voice and data
communications should have as much commonality as practicable wlth tile
equipment used In the logistics vehiclesand earth-returnvehicles.
DG-AOM-178. Continuous indication of space station attitude or attitude
changes should be provided to the command and control center(s).
DG-OPS-179. Crew activity should be restricted during transfer of
volatile, flammable, or explosive materials either between docked spacecraft,
the logistics vehicle, or within the space station. These restrictionsshould
apply to the use of high Yoltage equipment, conduct of high temperature
experiments, or other activity which would involve a potential source of
ignition in the immed_.iteneighborhoodof the material transfer route.
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DG-OPS-180. The _lumuerof crew members in any compartment at one time
i should be held to a minimum necessary to perform the required functions.
l} DG-OPS-IBI. Crew members should De restricted from movement about the
stationother than within specifiedand assigned areas.
DG-INT-182. The areas in which the crew spends most of its time
(staterooms, dining facilities, personal hygiene areas, exercise and
recreationareas) should be designed as the safest parts of the space station.
DG-C&W-I83. Critical visual/audible C&W alarms should be displayed in
alI inhabitedcompartments.
DG-COI.I-I84.An independent emergency communications system should be
provided for directing and controlling operational activities in emergency
situations.
DG-OPS-I85. A sufficient number of logistics and/or t_scue vellicles
should be docked to the space station at all times to accomodate every
on-board crew member in the event that emergency evacuationis required.
_-, DG-COM-186. Independent emergency communications should be provided to
assist EVA personnel in performing their tasks or to facilitate rescue of EVA
=_ personnel.
_. DG-EPD-187. Emergency lighting system silouldbe provided to assist EVA
-_ personnel in performingtheir task or to facilitaterescue of EVA _ersonnelj:
DG-OPS-188. Periodic drills for all personnel should be devised, and
_ conducted in response to unscheduled simulated emergencies, so that cretl
proficiencyis maintained in emergency procedures.
DG-OPS-I89. ";'ireResistallt"areas should be established to provide
haven from fire. Emergency procedures should be e_tablished to identify suci_
things as optimum routes to haven from any area, and all personnel should be
trained in these procedures.
DG-OPS-190. Procedures should be established and training provided to
the crew which will enable them to cope with any foreseeablecontingency that
migiltarise during EVA.
DG-C&W-IgI. An adequate fire warning system sllouldbe provided. The
warning should be activated by smoke or fumes, as well as l_eat,and should
warn the entire space station. The precise location of the fire should be
provided to the command and control center(s). All segments of the warning
system should be resistant to temperature extremes, decompression/overpressure
or shock and should be self-lndicatingwhen failed."
DG-FSE-Ig2. A means for monitoring fluid quantity usage should be
provided to permit the crew to detect excessive consumption rates and low
remaining supply levels.
DG-C&W-Ig3. The commencement, behavior, and completion of a11 remote
hazardous resupply operations (pressurizedliquid or gas resupply) should be
positivelyindicatedat the command and control center(s).
I00 _ ._
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DG-OPS-194. Overall health and safety responsibilities sr,ould be
| assigned to specificmembers of the crew with alternates.
DG-OPS-IgS. Procedures should include the provisions for abort for all
incoming vehicles having an on-board emergency which would jeopardize the
space station.
DG-EPG-196. An emergency power source which is completely independentof
the primary power source sho,,idbe provided.
DG-OPS-197. An initial advanced manning teanlsl,,uldcheck llabitability
of the sp_ce station prior to duty crew manning.
DG-COI4-1gS.A visual warning should be provided to the command center(s)
when any link of the space station communications.vst_mfails.
DG-COM-Igg. At least one intercommunicationsstation should be provided
for each separately pressurizable space station compartment that can be
occupied by the crew.
DG-INT-200. The n,aintenance quipment, proceduresand skills required to
completely analyze and isolate component failures and accomplish the needed
replacementor repair should be provided.
DG-C&W-201. Critical subsystems of docked transient vehicles should be
continuously monitored in the space station command and control center(s),
with appropriatewarnings for out-of-toleranceconditions.
L DG-OPS-202. All EVA and IVA suited activities shall be backed up and
, monitored by a suited crew member who is in a position to provide immediate
assistance.
_ DG-OPS-Z03. A periodic, two-way communicationscheck should be made by
_{_ the command and control center with all elements that comprise the space
"_ station. A "no communications" period wo_,Id automatically intiate space
station emergencyprocedures.
I)G-OPS-204.Armable subsystef,lsthat comprise the space station and its
docked vehicles should be ar_ed only when they are to be used and immediately
disarmed when their function is no longer required.
DG..INT-205.The pressurized compartmentsoF a space station should have
adequate free volume (not occupied by equipment or structure) to provide the
crew freedom of movement and a psychological and nllysiologicalenvironment
that is commensuratewith their orbital stay duration.
DG-C&W-206. Leak detectors should he provided for propellant handling
equipment located in unpressurlzedareas of tilespace station. The detectors
should activatean alarm at the command and control center(s).
_r
_i DG-INT-207. Replacement components should be designed so that it is
impossibleto inadvertentlyinstall the component incorrectly.
DG-INT-?08. Universally sized, minimum time to don or pl(.r.e,survival
devices should be made _va(lableto the crew.
i01
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DG-INT-209. All switches should be designed and located so tllatthe
possibilityof inadvertentactivationor improperselection is minimized.
DG-MSE-2IO. Design of mechanisms shall minimize the number of moving
parts or other maintenance task generators.
DG-FSE-211. Small clearances in fluid system should be avoided where
fluid entrained particulants could cause binding or jamming of system
components.
DG-STR-212. Hatch design shall avoid seal abrading in normal operation.
DG-STR-213. Provisions shall be made for moisture removal between
transparencypanes.
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APPENDIX-E
i SPACE STATIQNRELIABILITYREQU RENENTS
(Assumed)
I. All subsystemsshall be designed to be fail operational/fai)safe
restorableas a minimum (except primary structureand pressure vessels)
during all operationalphases except during assembly and during
scheduled/unscheduledmaintenance/repair. During assembly and during
scneduled/unscl}eduledmaintenance/repair,all subsystemsshall be
designed to be fail safe as a minimum.
? Crltical functions (i.e., those related to crew safety or space station
permanence)shall have backup or workaroundmodes.
3. Redundant functionalpaths or subsystemsshall be designed so tha'.their
operationalstatus can be verifiedwithout removal of ORU's. In
addition, these redundantfunctionalpaths of subsystem shall be
designed so that their operationalstatus can be verified in flight to
the maximum extent possible. As a minimum, these chall provide
capability for redundancymanagement in tileevent of a malfunction of a
functionalpath and shall provide informationto the crew regarding
redundancystatus of the affected system sufficient to determine if a
failure occurred. Critical redundantitems whose failure cannot be
! detected during flight shall be identifiedin the individualspace
w station critical items list. Redundancieswithin a functionalpati_
_ shall be so designed that their operationalstatus can be verified prior
to each installationinto the vehicle.
4. Alternate or redundantmeans of performinga critical function shall be
physically separatedor protectedat least to the extent of separating
the first means from the alternatemeans, such that an event whicll
_ causes the loss of one means from the alternatemeans, such that an
event which causes the loss of one means of performingthe functionwill
not result in the loss of alternate or redundantmeans.
5. Redundantcomponents susceptibleto contaminationor envirormental
failure causes such as shock, vibration,accelerationor heat loads
shall be physicallyoriented or separatedto reduce the chance ol
multiple failure from the same cause(s).
6. Repair, service, or checkout of a functionalpath, including
deactivation,shall not degrade the specifiedredundancylevel.
7. For reliabilitydesign purposes,a redundant path deactivationfor
maintenanceor repair shall be considereda failure.
8. Redundantequipment, lines, cables, and utility runs which are critical
for safety of personnelor continued facilityoperation shall be routed
in separate compartments(i.e., separatedby a structuralwall) or
protected against fire, smoke, contamination,overpressurization,and
shrapnel.
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g. For systems/subsystemsusing redundantor alternate functione,l patas,
the following requlrements appiy.
a. Redundantpaths shall be electricallyand physicallyseparated tu
the extent chat an event that causes the loss of one meaps will not
cause the loss of an alternateor redundantmeans.
b. Notificationof loss of redundacyshall be automaticallyprovided
to the crew via caution and warning alert signals.
lO. Isolationof anomalies or critical functions shall be provided such that
a faulty subsystemelement can be deactivatedeither automaticallyor
manually without disruptingor interruptingalternate or redundant
functionalpaths. Capabilityto fault-isolateto the line replaceable
unit or group of units without disconnectionsor use of carry-on
equipment, shall be provided.
If. System hardware shall be designed to minimize the use of special tools
and equipment For maintenanceor repair. If special tools are required,
and nave been authorized,they shall have a life of I0 years min_n_um.
12. The operationaldesign life goal shall be a minimum r_flO years _ith
scheduledmaintenance limited to calibrationand to replacmentof
consumablesand hardwarewhose life is limited by wear or a_ing.
Avionics
13. All avionics systems/subsystemssl}allbe designed such that any two
nonsimultaneousfailures (allowingsufficienttime for automatic
reconfigurationor reconfigurationby the crew) can be detected,
isolated,and repairs accomplishedwithout the loss of a mission or
compromisingsystem safety.
14. Space station avionics and subsystemelectricalcomponents shall meet
all the safety and performancerequirementswhen exposed to tile
as-installedelectromagneticenvironmentfrom all sources.
lB. All electronicscontaininghigh density integratedcircuitry shall
survive repetitivesingle event state changes caused by ionizing
radiation environmentsof the space station.
Mechanical
16. Primary structures shall be designed to preclude failure by adequate
safety factors and relief provisions. Pressurevessels shall also use
design safety factors and relief provisionsas well as being built to
leak rather than explode.
17. Provisionsshall be made for arming explosive devices as near to the
time of expected use as Is feasible. Provisionsshall be made to
promptly disarm explosive devices when no longer needed.
104
O0000002-TSA13
Definition
|
Fall-Operatlonal- The ability to sustain a failure and retain full
operationalcapability for mission continuatlun.
Fail-Safe - The ability ue sustai1_a failure and retain the capability
to-successfullyterminatetne miss',on. F_,"GSE, the ability to sustain
a failurewithout causing loss of ve',,irlc,systep_(s)_r lost of
personnel capability.
Additional definitionof terms:
M[_sidn _efini-nation-
a. For equipment operating in _pace away F,_- i_utusing the space
sta,;ionas its base is safe ,L,turn of crev_and w.q_icleto the
space station.
b. For the space statlor is the establish_,._ntof safe llaven_ode
of operation for cre_ and station.
c. For space stationenO-of-lifeis the safe removal of tilecrew
and safe disposalof the space station.
Restorable I."the ability to repair-replacea ,ailed system or sb.uem
element prior to the start of a catastrophicsequence of events.
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